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The paper considers the owners of the firms as normal investors who want to 
optimise the return from their investments in accordance with their wealth 
constraint and the risk of their investment in the firm. The paper tests this 
theory on a representative sample of Danish companies including small firms. 
Concerning the wealth constraint for owners, the study finds evidence of 
more dispersed ownership in larger and more capital-demanding firms. 
According to the investors risk aspect, firms operating on foreign markets are 
more likely to have more than one owner. Concerning the domestic markets 
the owner structure is more dispersed in industries with a volatile business 
cycle. 
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JEL Classification: L2, D21. Introduction 
The interest in different aspects of corporate governance is growing with the 
spread of performance-related pay of firm executives. One part of the 
empirical studies in this area has focused on the relation between corporate 
management payment and performance of the firm. Another part has studied 
the relationship between firm performance and the board and owner structure 
of the firm. However, the question of what factors determine the number of 
owners of the company has not been studied empirically. This paper 
contributes to an answer to this question by presenting empirical evidence 
from 1,200 Danish companies concerning the concentrations of owners, 
characteristics of the companies and their environment. 
 
Large public companies with a highly diffuse ownership structure may have a 
weak owner control with a less efficient management of the firm as top 
executives pursue other priorities than shareholder values. However, as 
shown by La Porta et al. (1999), the large company with a diffuse ownership 
control is actually non-existing. Even among the 20 biggest companies in 
each country studied, they found only one or a few big blockholders 
controlling the firms in all 46 countries except for the USA and the UK. For all 
smaller non-traded companies a few blockholders are common also in the 
USA and the UK.  
 
Despite the fact that a company with only a few blockholders is the normal 
picture of the ownership structure, most of the available empirical evidence 
on the governance-performance link is based on datasets with big companies 
from the USA and the UK. However, Lehmann and Weigand (2000) 
examined a larger sample of 361 German companies and contrary to the 
US/UK results, they found a negative impact on firm profitability from 
ownership concentration. This paper follows this track and focuses on a 
representative sample of Danish companies. Contrary to many earlier studies 
in this area this sample also include smaller firms and companies not listed 
on the stock exchange. 
  1The next section discusses the different theories and the hypothesis put 
forward to explain the dispersion of firm ownership. Section 3 presents the 
cross-section data set of 1,200 Danish firms, section 4 presents the empirical 
findings and section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
As mentioned above, the traditional view that dispersed ownership results in 
weak owners is not that observable at all. The theory predicts that in firms 
with weak owners, the managers are tempted to pursue other goals than 
max. long-run profit. A typical example is substitution of short-run profits for 
R&D investments in order to secure their own salary and job position. The 
probability of pursuing other goals is expected to increase if the manager 
salary depends on the actual performance of the firms and if the period over 
which managers are evaluated by the board of the firm is shorter than the 
pay-off period from R&D. 
 
As pointed out by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), this theory cannot explain that 
most of the companies have more than one owner. The theory is founded on 
the presumption that the incentive to shirking or free riding increases when 
the number of owners in the company increases. However, from this point of 
view the optimal number of owners is one because in that situation the whole 
return from the efforts put into monitoring the management belongs to the 
owner himself and should not be shared with other owners. Therefore, to 
explain the fact that generally the companies have more than one owner 
other factors may be included in the owners’ decisions about the optimal 
number of owners. They suggest a portfolio explanation from the point of view 
of the owner who wants to maximize the return on his total wealth for a given 
risk or alternatively minimize the risk for a given return. From this portfolio 
perspective at least two factors are important for the investors decision about 
the share to invest in a given firm.  
 
The first factor is that owners are wealth-constrained, so under some 
circumstances they have to invite equity capital from outside. The lack of 
  2capital occurs when the founder of the company has several lawful 
successors and none of them individually could raise the full equity capital of 
the firm. In this situation, the successor may share the company or invite 
external ownership from outside the family. Therefore as a result of this 
natural development, older firms are expected to have more owners than 
younger firms. 
  
The size of a company is an important determinant of the capital requirement 
to run the business. Larger companies have a higher demand for capital and 
are expected to have a more dispersed ownership structure due to the wealth 
constraint of the individual owner of the company. Furthermore, for larger 
companies with a highly dispersed ownership structure an investor can gain 
full control of the company if he is in position of just small fraction of the 
shares. This effect further strengthens the dispersion of ownership with 
increasing firm size.        
 
Due to cultural barriers and lack of information the foreign investors co-
operation with domestic investors are difficult and he therefore typically wants 
to be in possession of all the shares of a firm in order to control the firm 
effectively. Therefore the existence of foreign owners among the blockowners 
is expected to affect the number of owners negatively. 
 
The same line of reasoning can be used concerning the number of bank 
connections. Thus, the number of bank connections is expected to affect the 
number of blockholders positively because in the initial phase of the firm’s life 
growth needs more funding and as noted above the cheapest way to fund 
new projects is probably to invite new equity capital into the firm. However, 
before reaching that point the firm needs a reputation in order to increase the 
number of shares. Therefore the firm has probably tried to expand using other 
credit sources, i.e. they have more than one bank connection, which will 
probably last for a certain period. For that reason bank loan and new equity 
capital could be viewed as substitute in financing the firm. 
 
But also the developments in the company itself can requisite external equity 
  3capital if the actual owners do not have deep pockets. Thus a high capital 
intensity is expected to increase the demand for capital and therefore the 
number of blockowners. As the firms may face an increasing supply curve for 
funds they may want to finance new investments by attracting new equity 
capital, i.e. increasing the number of owners. Naturally, the strength of this 
argument increases the longer pay back period and the larger risk there is in 
connection with the investment. The same is likely to happen for companies 
with high growth and/or with a low profitability and therefore low retained 
earning. Furthermore, firms with a high solvency rate are less wealth-
constrained and therefore expected to have fewer owners. 
 
Another factor leading to more owners is that the individual investor or family 
may want to diversify their portfolio on more than one firm in order to reduce 
the risk of their total wealth. From this portfolio, perspective one would expect 
the ownership to be more dispersed in firms where the earnings are highly 
volatile. This may be the case in industries where the demand fluctuates due 
to the business cycle or frequent shifts in consumer preferences.  
 
The risk may also be higher for internationally oriented firms. Compared to 
domestic markets more risk is expected from firms operating on foreign 
markets. Consequently if the firm belongs to an industry with high export 
intensity, the probability of more than one owner is higher than usual. 
 
  
3. Data   
The data used in this study is based on public information on accounts of 
Danish firms over the period 1990 to 1999. The data source is a private 
company (Købmandsstandens Oplysningsbureau A/S), who collects firm-
specific information derived from each Danish firm’s legal obligation to submit 
accounts reports to the Danish authorities. In principle, all Danish firms are 
included in the database that takes the form of an unbalanced longitudinal 
data set.  
 
  4The sample used in this paper relates to one year, 1997, and the account 
data has for the larger firm been supplemented with information concerning 
their ownership structure. Data on ownership has been collected from various 
issues of the yearly publication Greens – “Børsens håndbog om dansk 
erhvervsliv”. The firms included in Greens either have more than 50 
employees or a turnover exceeding DKK 50 million in 1994 prices. 
 
A summary description of the data used in the estimations is given in Table 1. 
The ownership variables take account of the different distribution of the 
shares among the owners at least for the three largest owners. The one 
owner dummy variable equals 1 when the firm has one owner and zero 
elsewhere and the largest share of the firms has only one owner - 65%. The 
concentration index for one-, two- and three owners are calculated as their 
shares in the ownership of the firm. The average value of these indexes 
shows that the ownership is highly concentrated on a few owners for the 
majority of firms.  
 






One owner (dummy)  1217  0.6491  0.4774 
One owner concentration  1057  0.8137  0.3001 
Two owner concentration  1018  0.8989  0.2230 
Three owner concentration  973  0.9348  0.1775 
Turnover (log)  1217  16.7621  0.9884 
Capital labour ratio (log)  1217  10.2694  1.5926 
Age (log)  1217  3.0974  0.8575 
Number of banks  1214  1.2306  0.5066 
Solvency 1217  0.3063  0.2667 
Foreign-owned (dummy)  1217  0.2629  0.4404 
Personally-owned (dummy)  1201  0.2622  0.4401 
Parent company (dummy)  1217  0.3706  0.4832 
Listed company (dummy)  1217  0.0567  0.2313 
Cycle industries  1217  92224  323473 
Growth industries  1214  3.5626  19.611 
Concentration 1217  0.1842  0.2016 
Manufacturing (dummy)  1217  0.4009  0.4902 
High tech industry (dummy)  1217  0.0213  0.1446 
Internationalisation 1216  0.2648  0.2237 
 
 
The definition of turnover, capital labour ratio, age, number of banks and 
dummies for foreign-owned firms, personally owned firms, parent company, 
listed company and manufacturing is straightforward. Solvency is defined as 
the equity capital share of the total balance, and the variable for 
internationalisation is the export share of the industry. In addition, a dummy 
variable for the high tech industries is included in order to control for 
technological opportunities and risks across industries. To take account of the 
risk of the business cycle the variable cycle, measure the standard variation of 
  6the industrial turnover from 1990 to 1997. Market growth is measured by the 
increase in industrial turnover from 1990 to 1997.  
 
To highlight the impact of firm size, Table 2 shows the share of one owner, 
share of parent company and share of foreign owned firm for different firm 
size categories. On average the share of firms with one owner are rather 
constant up to a firm size of 500 employed where the largest companies has a 
substantially lower share of one owner. The share of parent companies fall 
with firm size in the beginning and then increase for the largest firms. This 
implies that subsidiaries normally are median sized. The share of foreign-
owned firm is rather constant across firm size except for the largest firms 
where the share is significant less. 
 
Table 2. Some ownership characteristics related to firm’s size.









employed        
0 – 20  78  0.718  0.538 0.308 
21 – 50  207  0.715  0.435  0.329 
51- 250  684  0.643  0.341  0.244 
251 – 500  150  0.667  0.327  0.280 
501 +   98 0.469 0.378  0.194 




  74.  Empirical results 
To analyse the owner structure of the firms and the effects from the factors 
determining the number of owners we first estimate the probability that a firm 
has more than one owner by a logit model in table 3. Then we move on to 
estimate 3 different owner concentration ratios by a Tobit model in table 4. 
Assuming a logistic probability function, the probability that a firm has more 
than one owner can be written as 









       (1) 
 
   ' wx β ε =+        (2) 
 
Where x is a column vector of explanatory variables,  $ is a column vector of 
the explanatory variables’ parameters and finally g is the error term.  
    
Tables 3 present the estimated parameters from various experiments using 
the standard logit estimation form. Model 1 includes some important 
characteristics of the firms together with variables for the turnover and the 
capital labour ratio to indicate the company’s demand of equity capital. 
Companies owned by foreigners have a significantly lower probability of more 
than one owner compared to domestic firms. This effect is in accordance with 
the theoretical discussion above where the foreign investors want to control 
the firm due to cultural barriers between a foreign owner and a domestic 
owner, which make a co-operation as owners more difficult. 
 
  8Table 3. Logit models of the probability of a firm having more than one owner. 
Notes: Numbers in brackets are standard errors of the estimated parameters. * indicates that 
the estimated parameter differs significantly from zero at the 5% level of significance and ** at 
the 1% level. 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
























































High tech industry      0.2736 
(0.3730) 
Cycle industry      -4.3E-7 
(2.9E-7) 
Growth industry      -0.0064 
(0.0075) 
Internationalisation     0.0086** 
(0.0033) 
Log likelihood  383.56  396.29  406.45 
Concordance 82.2  82.7  83.0 
Number of observations  1201  1198  1194 
 
Personally owned firms and parent companies have a more dispersed owner 
structure and the effect is very significant. For personally owned firms this 
could be a result of a more tight wealth constraint for a person compared to a 
  9foundation or another company who could rise capital among its own owners. 
The higher dispersion for a parent company compared to a subsidiary firm 
may be connected to the business relation for a subsidiary. The parent 
company may be owned only for the investment return from a portfolio 
perspective. However, for a subsidiary the parent company may have a direct 
business relation with the subsidiary that adds value to its investment. It may 
therefore have a higher return from the subsidiary than other investors and for 
that reason take a larger share of the subsidiary. Companies listed on the 
stock exchange have also a significant higher probability of having more than 
one owner. Of cause this result is expected as no listed company by 
definitions could have only one owner.      
 
The size of the firm seems to be of importance for the dispersion of the 
ownership. The probability of having more than one owner is significantly 
higher for firms with a large turnover. According to the discussion above this 
result is not surprising as large firms are expected to demand more equity 
capital from their owners and the result indicates a capital constraint among 
investors. The capital labour ratio has a positive effect on the probability of a 
firm having more than one owner as expected. However, the effect is not 
significant. 
 
The age of the firm also has an effect on the owner structure where older 
firms are significantly more likely to have more than one owner. This is not a 
surprising result as many new and young firms are set up by an entrepreneur 
who may be the only owner for the first part of the life of the firm. As the firm 
and the founder grow older, the firm may be handed over to the founder’s 
relatives or outside owners and a more dispersed ownership is likely.  
 
Model 2 includes variables indicating the firm’s access to capital. The 
estimated parameter of the solvency variable is positive and significant. 
Solvent firms are more likely to have more than one owner this indicates that 
firms with several owners do not seem to be capital-constrained in the same 
way as firm with only one owner. The number of banks is also positively 
correlated with the number of owners. However, this effect is not significant. 
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Model 3 introduces four variables to control for different industrial 
environments. Concerning the type of industries, we introduce a dummy for 
the high tech industries to study where the high risk in these industries lead to 
a more dispersed owner structure. This is the case, however, the estimated 
parameter is not significant.  
 
To further pick up the risk aspect for the owners, a variable of the standard 
variation of the industrial turnover from 1990 to 1997 has been included. 
However, the estimated parameter is not significant and it has the wrong sign. 
Market growth is measured by the increase in industrial turnover from 1990 to 
1997 and there seems to be a weak negative effect on the probability of a firm 
having more than one owner.  
 
As introduced in the theoretical discussion, the degree of internationalisation 
of the firm is measured at the industrial level with the export share of the 
industries. Firms operating in exporting industries are more likely to have a 
dispersed ownership structure. This may be the result of the high risk 
associated with operations on foreign markets compared to the home market.  
 
The logit estimates presented in table 3 only used information on where a firm 
has one or more owners. However, the survey contains information on the 
share of the three largest owners for a smaller part of the sample. To make 
use of this information concentration indexes for the largest owner has been 
constructed. As a lot of firms have only a few owners these indexes take the 
value of 1 for a large part of the sample. Consequently, ordinary least square 
regression is not the optimal estimation technique and therefore a single 
censored Tobit model has been applied. The standard Tobit model can be 
written as: 
 








= + ,      i=1,2,....,n, y xu
=   if   ,           yy y





where  y corresponds to the owner concentration and the error term ui   is 





i i L=[1- ( / )] [( - )/ ] y xx
        
i β σβ σ Φ σ
     (4) 
 
where  M and N are the cumulative distribution and density function of the 
standard normal variable. Finally, the model is estimated using maximum 
likelihood regression analysis in SAS. 
 
Table 4 present the estimation results for the share of the largest owner, the 
two largest owners and the three largest owners. The table present models 
results with the same explanatory variables as in table 3 and generally the 
models perform best for the one owner index as the Log likelihood for that 
model take the lowest value. All the estimated parameters take the opposite 
sign of the estimated value in the logit estimation in table 3. This is expected 
as an increase in the probability of a firm having more than one owner may 
reduce the share of the largest owner.  
 
In accordance with the result of table 3 the foreign-owners has a higher share 
of the company then the domestic owners. In personally-owned firms, parent 
companies and listed companies on the other hand the largest owners have a 
significant lower share of firm. The size of the company and the capital labour 
ratio reduce the owner concentration. However, only the size-effect for the 
one owner concentration is significant.  
 
 
  12Table 4. Estimates of Tobit models for various owner concentrations. 
Notes: Numbers in brackets are standard errors of the estimated parameters. * indicates that 
the estimated parameter differs significantly from zero at the 5% level of significance and ** at 
the 1% level. 
































































































Log likelihood  -2128.8  -1390.5  -1030.9 
Number of observations  1048  1009  965 
Number of firms with a 
concentration of 1  702 789 803 
 
Older companies have a significant lower owner concentration even when the 
size of the company has been taken into account. This once more verify the 
  13entrepreneur theory, where the founder of the firm also own the firm but have 
to hand it over to his successors or invite more capital as time pass by. More 
banks reduce the owner concentration of the largest owners significantly. So 
banks are a substitute to large owners for a company.  
 
Companies operating in risky environment have a significantly lover owner 
concentration for the largest owner. This is due to firms belonging to 
industries with a volatile business cycle or firms within the exporting 
industries. Also firms in high tech industries have a lower owner 
concentration. However, this effect is not significant. 
 
 
4.  Conclusions 
From an efficiency point of view the firm ought to have only one owner. Most 
firms have several owners and the paper considers the owners of the firms as 
normal investors who want to optimise the return from their investments in 
accordance with the risk involved. As the owners are wealth-constrained and 
want to diversify their portfolio of investment, it is expected that firms have 
more owners if they have a high demand for capital or operate in risky 
environments. The paper tests these theories on a representative sample of 
about 1,200 Danish companies including small firms. 
 
Concerning the wealth-constraint for owners, the study finds evidence of more 
dispersed ownership in larger firms which may require more capital. Also 
capital incentive companies are more likely to have dispersed ownership. 
However, this effect is not significant. There is a significant positive relation 
between the solvency of a firm and the probability that it has more than one 
owner. The interpretation of this finding could be that firms with more than one 
owner have better aces to equity capital.  
 
According to the investors’ risk aspects, the study finds that firms operating on 
foreign markets are more likely to have more than one owner and the share of 
the largest owner is significant less compared to owners of firms operating in 
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the domestic markets.  Concerning the domestic market the owner 
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